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ficiency and equity goals and provide incentives for students to report their prefer-
ences truthfully. Debate centers largely on two rules: immediate acceptance (IA),
the so-called Boston mechanism, and deferred acceptance (DA). IA’s strength is ef-
ficiency, while DA is touted for its superior strategic properties. Thinking of these
as extremes, we advocate a compromise rule, immediate-acceptance-with-skips (IA+),
which slightly modifies IA to achieve better strategic properties while retaining effi-
ciency. IA+ proceeds in rounds of applications and, like IA, finalizes assignments in
each round. However, unlike IA or DA, IA+ allows students to “skip” applications to
schools with no remaining capacity. We show that IA+ is efficient and less manipula-
ble than IA+. Unfortunately, IA+ violates solidarity properties that both IA and DA
satisfy. Considering robustness, we find that each of the three rules satisfies a different
set of three natural invariance properties.
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1 Introduction
With careful theoretical, experimental, and empirical work, economists have won the ear
of school choice policy makers1. By drawing attention to the incentives rules provide for
students to truthfully report their preferences, economic analysis has shifted the debate and
spurred school districts to adopt new assignment procedures across the United States and
beyond2. To minimize opportunities to manipulate, districts have turned largely to rules
based on the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
Yet no assignment procedure meets all social objectives. Insisting that truth-telling be
a dominant strategy for students, the formal requirement of strategy-proofness, comes at a
cost. With deferred acceptance3 (DA), the most popular strategy-proof rule, the cost is in
terms of student welfare and may be substantial (Kesten, 2006). As in Boston, DA often
replaces an easily manipulable but efficient rule. With these trade-offs in mind, we ask
whether there is a middle ground with superior properties overall.
School choice rules typically simulate rounds of applications and rejections. While other
methods are possible, districts develop school priorities with this interpretation in mind.
Application-rejection algorithms differ primarily along two dimensions: When acceptances
are finalized and where rejected students apply next. At one extreme, DA makes acceptances
tentative until the very end. At the other extreme is Boston’s original rule, immediate
acceptance4 (IA), which finalizes acceptances in each round. Further refinement along this
dimension leads to a family of rules (Chen and Kesten, 2013).
While DA and IA finalize assignments at different points, both ask students to apply to
schools in the order listed in their preference rankings. As obvious as this approach seems, it
nevertheless leads to paradoxical results. With DA for example, a student’s application and
tentative acceptance may set off a chain of rejections that leads to her eventual rejection.
Her futile application only makes other students worse off. Similarly, a student may apply to
a school with no available seats. While inconsequential for DA, this leads to the most serious
cases of manipulability for IA. What if students “skipped” such applications? Beginning
1Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) kick-started the theoretical literature on school choice; Chen and
So¨nmez (2006) and Pais and Pinte´r (2008) contributed early experimental evidence.
2See, for example, case studies of New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a) and Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2005b, 2006) as well as discussion of assignment procedures used in Great Britain (Pathak and So¨nmez,
2008) and China (He, 2012; Chen and Kesten, 2013).
3Another strategy-proof proposal adapts Gale’s Top Trading Cycles and is also efficient (Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez, 2003). It has gained little traction, however, because many object to the idea of “trading”
priorities (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006).
4This rule is also called the “Boston mechanism”.
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with DA, eliminating futile applications5 restores efficiency but sacrifices strategy-proofness
(Kesten, 2010). We begin instead with IA and modify the algorithm so that students skip
applications to schools that have reached capacity. Our paper systematically analyzes this
new rule6, which we call immediate-acceptance-with-skips (IA+), and argues that it may be
a reasonable compromise between IA and DA.
To assess IA+, we recall the desirable properties motivating IA and DA. IA derives
much of its appeal from its efficiency properties7. Moreover, IA maximizes the number of
students assigned to their top-ranked schools. News reports often emphasize this easy-to-
interpret statistic, underscoring its salience and importance to the public. Like IA, IA+
always selects efficient assignments (Proposition 1), and for problems in which all schools
begin with available seats, it also assigns as many student as possible to their top-ranked
schools. Both properties are advantages over DA. To further compare IA and IA+, we
can refine our notion of efficiency by counting students assigned to their first choice, second
choice, and so on8. Neither rule, however, performs uniformly better on this dimension.
DA’s primary strength is strategy-proofness. In school choice, this is valuable for two
reasons. The first is practical: If a rule is manipulable, the properties it satisfies with respect
to reported preferences may no longer apply. For example, when students manipulate IA or
IA+, the outcome need not be efficient with respect to their true preferences (Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez, 2003). Worse, since the Nash equilibrium outcomes under IA and IA+ include
the entire stable set (Alcalde, 1996; Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006), the DA assignment Pareto
dominates the equilibrium assignments of IA and IA+. However, optimal manipulation
requires knowledge of priorities which may be unavailable to students. Moreover, in some low
information settings with cardinal preferences, manipulation may actually enhance efficiency
(Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011; Miralles, 2008; Featherstone and Niederle, 2008). While we
do not model incomplete information or include cardinal preferences, these examples show
that the cost of manipulability may be less than originally presumed. Furthermore, this
criticism may apply to DA as well: In experiments, large fractions of participants students
misrepresent their preferences even though truth-telling is a dominant strategy (Chen and
So¨nmez, 2006; Pais and Pinte´r, 2008; Chen and Kesten, 2013).
5In fact, deciding which applications to skip is a delicate procedure. Kesten (2010)’s “efficiency adjusted”
DA does so in a way that minimizes priority violations. Dog˘an (2013) modifies DA in a similar way to
accommodate affirmative action goals.
6The definition is not entirely new. Alcalde (1996) first formulated IA+ as a means to implement the
stable correspondence in two-sided matching. Miralles (2008) also suggests this modification.
7Indeed, efficiency has motivated renewed interest in IA. See, for example, Miralles (2008), Featherstone
and Niederle (2008), and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011).
8Featherstone (2013) suggests this approach.
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A second rationale for strategy-proofness invokes equity. If some students are sincere or
naive, we may worry that these students will be harmed when strategic students manipu-
late. By making truth-telling a dominant strategy for all students, strategy-proofness “levels
the playing field” (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2008). Indeed, this is true for IA: In data from
Boston, students often listed two over-demanded schools as their top choices, thereby losing
priority to savvier students (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006). Experimental data also show that
many students fail to “skip the middle” and list an over-demanded school second (Chen and
So¨nmez, 2006). While this criticism applies to IA, it has much less force against IA+. By
design, IA+ proactively “skips the middle”, thereby carrying out the most natural manip-
ulation for sincere students. This protective measure makes IA+ less manipulable than IA
in a formal sense9: Each problem in which IA+ is manipulable, IA is manipulable as well
(Proposition 5).
In addition to being strategy-proof, DA respects students’ priorities. More precisely, DA
is stable: If a student prefers another school to her own, then each student assigned to that
school has higher priority than her. Neither IA nor IA+ meets this requirement, and neither
can be called “more stable” than the other (Proposition 2). While this comparison favors
DA, we argue that the normative advantage is less than imagined.
As with strategy-proofness, our interest in stability depends on its interpretation. In two-
sided matching, stability is compelling. When matching residents to hospitals or pairing
men and women, the preferences on both sides count and stability is essential to prevent
unraveling10. Yet for school choice, where school priorities are administratively assigned,
stability is not obviously desirable. Fundamentally, we aim to answer the objections of
dissatisfied students and families.11 Interpreted by stability, justifications refer exclusively
to administratively determined priorities. But why ignore preferences? Instead, we may
evaluate objections with respect to augmented priorities. One example is rank-adjustment:
Assign highest priority to students who rank a school first, then those students who rank
the school second, and so on, using the administrative priorities to order students within
each class. If objections are evaluated against these rank-adjusted priorities, then stability
actually favors IA: IA is stable with respect to rank-adjusted priorities whereas DA is not12.
9This notion of relative manipulability is due to Pathak and So¨nmez (2013).
10See Roth (2008) for further discussion and examples.
11Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) propose this interpretation of stability, and this reasoning motivates the
term “justified envy”.
12The force of the justified envy argument weights most heavily against assignment procedures that allow
“trading” of priorities. There, it is difficult to provide a compelling reply to student objections which may
have been a decisive factor leading Boston to choose DA over TTC (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006). No similar
objections were leveled against IA.
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Moving beyond stability, we turn to notions of equity and robustness based on changes
in the environment. School assignments are not made in a static environment. For example,
current students may depart or new students arrive. Similarly, school capacities may change
as hiring decisions are finalized or renovation projects begun or completed. Even the set
of schools may change as new schools may open or existing schools close. We would like
to understand how these changes affect student welfare. First consider the departure of a
student. To the extent that school seats are scarce, this reduces competition. In this case,
it is natural to ask that remaining students be at least as well off as initially. This is the
formal requirement of population monotonicity13. Analogously, competition also decreases
when new seats become available. In this case, capacity monotonicity asks that all students
be at least as well off as before. These natural solidarity properties are common to DA and
IA. Unfortunately, IA+ satisfies neither (Proposition 3).
Some changes in the environment are arguably irrelevant to the assignment problem. We
consider three situations: (i) removal of an unavailable school from the list of schools; (ii)
removal of a student ultimately unassigned by a rule; and (iii) pre-assignment of a student to
the school the rule would have her attend. In each case, we require invariance. Surprisingly,
none of our rules is robust to all three changes (Proposition 4). IA+ satisfies (i), an advantage
over DA, and (ii), an advantage over IA. Only IA satisfies (iii), however14.
Since IA+ does not satisfy all desirable properties on the full domain of assignment
problems, we ask whether it does on a smaller domain. In particular, we identify a maximal
domain formed by restricting priority-capacity structures. The conditions are stringent: The
combined capacity of even the smallest two schools with available seats must be sufficient to
accommodate the entire student population (Proposition 6). This is slightly less demanding
than the corresponding condition for IA (Chen, 2014) and somewhat more demanding than
a related condition sufficient to ensure that DA is efficient (Ergin, 2002; Klaus and Klijn,
2013).
Related literature
Our paper contributes to three strands of the school choice literature. First, several recent
studies have reassessed IA. Miralles (2008) makes an efficiency-based case for IA, while
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011) reach similar conclusions in incomplete information environ-
ments. Ongoing experimental work has yielded mixed evaluations of the rules, suggesting
13For original references, see Thomson (1983a) and Thomson (1983b).
14In fact, the same conclusion obtains when we weaken (iii) to non-bossiness, which requires invariance
when a student’s preferences change but her school does not change.
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opportunities to improve on them in practice15. Also, Kojima and U¨nver (2014) characterize
IA using several of the properties we consider here.
Second, intending to improve on the baseline rules, numerous papers recommend com-
promises. We have already mentioned one important example, Kesten (2010)’s “efficiency
adjusted” DA, which modifies DA to attain efficiency. Dog˘an (2013) adapts this proce-
dure to improve the welfare of minority students in a controlled choice setting. In similar
spirit, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2014) propose “choice augmented” DA, which enriches the
choice framework so students influence tie-breaking by “targeting” schools. Morrill (2013d)
and Morrill (2013c) take another approach, beginning instead with top trading cycles and
modifying it to reduce priority violations. This tact preserves both efficiency and strategy-
proofness. More closely related to our approach, Mennle and Seuken (2014) study incentive
properties of a randomized version of IA+ with uniform priorities across schools. Also, con-
current with our work, Dur (2013)16 defines a version of IA+ and independently proves part
of our Proposition 5.
Finally, our technical results for restricted domains add to a growing literature on the
role of priorities. Ergin (2002) shows that the priority-capacity structure must satisfy a
stringent “acyclicity” condition to ensure that DA is efficient or group strategy-proof. Klaus
and Klijn (2013) extends this result to general domains and Chen (2014) develops analogous
conditions under which IA is stable or strategy-proof. Relatedly, Erdil and Ergin (2011) and
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) investigate the role of indifferences in school priorities.
The remainder of the paper comprises four sections. Section 2 introduces the formal
model and our leading rules. We discuss efficiency and equity properties in Section 3 and
turn to incentives in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5. We relegate all proofs to the
appendix.
2 Model
There is a set of potential students N and a set of potential schools A. A school choice
problem consists of a population of students and list of schools. Students are defined by
their preferences over schools, and schools are defined by their capacities and priorities over
students. Because we will be interested in a variety of relational properties, we specify the
15The most relevant experimental studies are Chen and So¨nmez (2006), Pais and Pinte´r (2008), Feather-
stone and Niederle (2008), and Chen and Kesten (2013). Additionally, He (2012) and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.
(2006) report empirical preference data from Boston and Beijing, and Miralles (2008) compares IA and DA
with simulated data.
16I thank Battal Dog˘an for bringing this paper to my attention.
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model with sufficient generality to allow all aspects to vary. To emphasize these properties,
we retain the standard assumption of complete information.
Formally17, let R be the set of linear orders over A and Π the set of linear orders
over N . A problem is now a list e ≡ (N,A, q,R,) such that N ⊆ N , ∅ ∈ A ⊆ A,
q ≡ (qa)a∈A ∈ ZA+, R ≡ (Ri)i∈N ∈ RN , and ≡ (a)a∈A ∈ ΠA. By assumption, a null school,
∅, is always available (q∅ = ∞). The set of problems is E . An assignment (or match) for
e is a function µ : N → A such that for each a ∈ A, |{i ∈ N : µi = a}| ≤ qa and the set of
assignments isM. A rule is a function ϕ : E →M.
We study three rules defined by closely related algorithms. Each algorithm proceeds in
rounds with students applying to schools according to their preferences.
• Immediate acceptance
First round : Each student applies to her most preferred school. Each school accepts
students from among its applicants in order of priority up to its capacity and rejects
the others. These acceptances are final.
Subsequent rounds : Each unassigned student applies to her most preferred school to
which she has not previously applied. Each school accepts students from among its
new applicants in order of priority up to its remaining capacity and rejects the others.
• Immediate-acceptance-with-skips
First round : Each student applies to her most preferred school among those with
available seats. Each school accepts students from among its applicants in order of
priority up to its capacity and rejects the others. These acceptances are final.
Subsequent rounds : Each unassigned student applies to her most preferred school
among those with available seats to which she has not previously applied. Each school
accepts students from among its new applicants in order of priority up to its remaining
capacity and rejects the others.
• Deferred acceptance
First round : Each student applies to her most preferred school. Each school accepts
students from among its applicants in order of priority up to its capacity and rejects
the others. These acceptances are tentative.
17We define problems with preferences over the set of potential schools and priorities over the set of po-
tential students for notational convenience. The rules we study depend only on the restriction of preferences
and priorities to the sets of schools and students named in the problem, and our results apply if preferences
and priorities are replaced with these restrictions.
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Subsequent rounds : Each unassigned student applies to her most preferred school to
which she has not previously applied. Each school accepts students from among its new
applicants and tentatively accepted students in order of priority up to its remaining
capacity and rejects the others.
The immediate acceptance rule, IA, the immediate-acceptance-with-skips rule,
IA+, and deferred acceptance rule, DA, apply the corresponding algorithms in each
problem.
The three algorithms differ in two ways: (i) when acceptances are finalized and (ii) where
rejected students apply next. According to the immediate acceptance algorithm, students
may apply to schools with no remaining capacity. The immediate-acceptance-with-skips
algorithm modifies the immediate acceptance algorithm by allowing students to “skip” these
applications. We can think of tentative acceptances as a further change along the same
lines: Effectively, the deferred acceptance algorithm allows students to “skip” applications
to schools where they will be rejected. Carried out in a forward-looking manner, “rejection
skips” lead to the same outcome as tentative acceptances. In this way, the immediate-
acceptance-with-skips rule moves “part way” toward deferred acceptance18. While intuitive
to call these improvements, the transitions entail costs as well as benefits. The remainder
of the paper explores these trade-offs. Before turning to properties, we illustrate differences
among the three rules in an example.
Example 1. Comparing IA, IA+, and DA. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(2) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d
a b b c c 1 4 2
...







The table below computes the assignments made by each rule. Boxes represent final accep-
18In addition to immediate and (fully) tentative acceptances, intermediate notions are possible. Varying
the conditions under which tentative acceptances become final leads to a family of rules which includes IA
and DA (Chen and Kesten, 2013). However, IA+ is not a member of the family.
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tances and asterisks represent tentative acceptances. We have:
DA(e) =
(










(1, a), (2, b), (3, a), (4, c), (5, d)
)
.
Both IA and IA+ assign student 4 to school c in the first round of applications. In contrast,
DA makes only a tentative assignment which is later overturned. IA and IA+ differ in their
treatment of student 3’s preferences. In the second round, c is unavailable and so IA+ skips
this school and has student 3 apply directly to her third choice, a, where she is accepted.
Under IA, student 3 nevertheless applies to c in the second round and consequently loses her
priority at a to student 5. Both IA and IA+ select efficient assignments. However, the DA
assignment is inefficient because exchanging the assignments of students 2 and 4 would make
both better off. On the other hand, the DA assignment is stable and cannot be manipulated.
Since student 3 has higher priority than student 4 at c, the IA and IA+ assignments are
unstable. Moreover, student 3 can manipulate both assignments by reporting preferences
with c at the top.
DA(e)
Round a b c d
1 1∗ 2∗, 3 4∗, 5
2 1∗, 5∗ 2∗ 3∗, 4
3 1∗, 5∗ 2, 4∗ 3∗
4 1∗, 5∗ 4∗ 2∗, 3
5 1∗, 3∗, 5 4∗ 2∗
6 1 , 3 4 2 5
IA(e)
Round a b c d
1 1 2 , 3 4 , 5
2 1 , 5 2 , 3 4
3 1 , 3, 5 2 4
4 1 , 5 2 4 3
IA+(e)
Round a b c d
1 1 2 , 3 4 , 5
2 1 , 3 , 5 2 4
3 1 , 3 2 4 5
In the example, student 3’s application to her first choice school is ineffectual, and under
either IA or IA+ she can achieve a better assignment by skipping this application. However,
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applying to b may be reasonable if she is uncertain about her priority at the school. In this
case, her choice whether to list b or c first reflects her willingness to roll the dice. Now her
decision reflects her preference intensity, rather than a naive failure to strategize. On the
other hand, both b and c are oversubscribed so no degree of optimism about her priorities
justifies listing both of these schools at the top. Here, we have legitimate concern that sincere
reporting disadvantages student 3. IA+ corrects this.
3 Efficiency, equity, and robustness
School choice aims to improve student welfare. Of course, seats are scarce, so not all students
can be assigned to their most preferred schools. We also expect rules to resolve conflicts
of preferences fairly. Similarly, we expect rules to respond reasonably to changes in the
environment. To achieve these additional objectives, we may even trade-off efficiency19. In
this section, we evaluate our rules according to these goals, beginning with efficiency.
3.1 Efficiency
An assignment is (Pareto) efficient if there is no other assignment that all students find
at least as good and one student prefers, and a rule is efficient if it always selects efficient
assignments. IA, of course, is efficient, and we show that IA+ is as well. In contrast, DA can
be highly inefficient20. Moreover, IA and IA+ may select assignments that Pareto dominate
the DA assignment. Restrictions on the priorities can ensure efficiency, but priorities must
be nearly identical across schools (Ergin, 2002). However, sibling attendance, proximity, and
other commonly considered factors introduce too much diversity across schools to satisfy
these conditions.
To further compare IA and IA+, we consider a refinement of efficiency based on rank
distributions.21 The rank distribution of an assignment counts the number of students as-
signed their first choice, second choice, and so on. Formally, given an assignment µ, for each
k = 1, . . . , |A|, let N(k, µ) ≡ ∣∣{i ∈ N : |{a ∈ A : a Ri ϕi(e)}| = k}∣∣. The rank distribu-
tion of µ is N(µ) ≡ (N(k, µ))|A|
k=1
and µ is rank efficient if there is no other match whose
19For example, auctioning school seats would lead to a (fully) efficient assignment. That no serious proposal
recommends an auction shows that other social objectives weigh heavily in school choice.
20In fact, DA may assign nearly all students to their least preferred schools. See Kesten (2010) for
examples.
21Featherstone (2013) introduces the following notion and shows that it implies efficiency.
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rank distribution first-order stochastically dominates N(µ).22 A rule is rank efficient if it
always selects rank efficient assignments.
When all schools have available seats, IA and IA+ make the same assignments in the first
round and maximize the number of students assigned their first choice schools. However,
neither rule is rank efficient. IA+ “skips” some applications and so moves more quickly
to lower ranks than does IA. Consequently, we may expect IA to yield superior rank
distributions. For example, if a student’s first choice school is unavailable, she applies directly
to her second choice school under IA+ and may displace a student who ranks that school
first. In fact, even the DA assignment may rank dominate the IA+ assignment. Somewhat
surprisingly, as we illustrate in the appendix, the comparison of rank distributions can also
favor IA+. Proposition 1 summarizes our conclusions.
Proposition 1. (i) Both IA and IA+ are efficient while DA is not. (ii) Moreover, there
exist problems in which IA and IA+ may Pareto dominate DA. (iii) None of the rules is
rank efficient. (iv) Furthermore, there exist problems in which IA rank dominates IA+ as
well as problems in which IA+ rank dominates IA. (v) IA rank dominates DA whenever
their rank distributions are comparable by first-order stochastic dominance.
3.2 Equity
When choosing among school choice rules, efficiency is not the only concern. As DA derives
much of its appeal from equity properties, it is important to understand how IA+ compares
according to these criteria. We begin with stability and then turn to solidarity properties.
Given e ∈ E , µ is individually rational if for each i ∈ N , we have µi Ri ∅ and is non-
wasteful if for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A, a Pi ϕ(e) implies |ϕa(e)| = qa. The assignment
violates student i’s priority at a if a Pi µi and there is j ∈ N such that i a j and
µj = a. The assignment is stable if it is individually rational, non-wasteful, and eliminates
priority violations. A rule is individually rational, non-wasteful, or stable if it always selects
assignments with the corresponding properties. Stability implies both individual rationality
and non-wastefulness23. It is immediate that IA, IA+, and DA are individually rational and
non-wasteful. However, only DA is stable.
Just as DA sometimes selects an efficient assignment, both IA and IA+ sometimes select
stable assignments. In particular, this occurs whenever either rule select the same assignment
22The rank distribution µ first-order stochastically dominates, abbreviated sd-dominates, µ′ if µ 6= µ′
and for each l = 1, . . . , |A|, ∑lk=1 |N(k, µ)| ≥∑lk=1 |N(k, µ′)|.
23Efficiency also implies these properties.
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as DA. At first glance, we might expect IA+ to be “more stable” than IA and to coincide
with DA whenever IA does, but this is not the case. More precisely, there is no relationship
between the sets of problems for which IA and IA+ select stable assignments. Proposition 2
summarizes.
Proposition 2. (i) DA, IA, and IA+ are individually rational and non-wasteful. (ii) DA
is stable while IA and IA+ are not. (iii) IA+ may select a stable match when IA does not
and, conversely, IA may select a stable match when IA+ does not.
In our context, individual rationality and non-wastefulness are unobjectionable; violation
of either property would exclude a rule from serious consideration. In contrast, concern about
priority violations is less well founded. As argued earlier, the typical motivation as “justified
envy” gives undue attention to administrative priorities. Again, however, our criticism is
model-specific: If schools are active agents with preferences rather than priorities, then
stability retains its full appeal and deserves top billing.
Our properties so far apply to static environments. Yet students arrive and depart,
schools open and close, and capacities change, and rule should respond appropriately to
these changes. When the environment changes, solidarity is the appropriate equity notion:
Students should be affected in the same direction so all gain or all lose. First consider
the departure of a student. In this case, there is less competition for existing seats and it
is natural to expect the remaining students to be better off. Reasoning similarly, if new
seats become available at existing schools, we may expect that students will be better off.
Formally, we ask that a rule satisfy24:
Population monotonicity: For each e ∈ E , each i ∈ N , and each j ∈ N\{i},
ϕj(N\{i}, A, q, R−i,) Rj ϕj(e).
Capacity monotonicity: For each e ∈ E , each q′ ∈ ZA+, and each i ∈ N , if q′ ≤ q, then
ϕi(e) Ri ϕi(N,A, q
′, R,).
Importantly, capacity monotonicity considers only changes in the capacity vector and
not the set of schools25. Unfortunately, unlike our other rules, IA+ satisfies neither of these
24Capacity monotonicity is a form of resource monotonicity and sometimes introduced by this name.
Alternate versions of these axioms model “departure” by raising the empty-set to the top of a students’
preference ranking (e.g., Kojima and Manea (2010); Afacan (2013)). These formulations are connected to
ours by uninterested student invariance, which we introduce in the next section.
25Capacity monotonicity can be given a strategic interpretation (Kesten, 2012): If schools have (un-
modeled) preferences over students and report capacities, violations of capacity monotonicity translate into
opportunities for schools to manipulate by misreporting their capacities. In this richer setting, IA is im-
mune to such manipulation while both DA and IA+ are manipulable via capacities (Kesten, 2012). The
manipulability of DA shows that capacity monotonicity is not sufficient for non-manipulability.
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properties.
Proposition 3. Both DA and IA are population monotonic and capacity monotonic while
IA+ satisfies neither property.
The reason IA+ may violate these properties is that schools may reach their capacities
at later steps in the algorithm after students leave or capacities increase. Consequently,
students “skip” fewer applications. Additional applications in the new problem may delay
the student application to her original school, at which point it may already be filled.
3.3 Robustness
When students depart or new seats become available at schools, we expect assignments
to change. In contrast, some changes to the environment are arguably irrelevant to the
assignment problem, and a desirable rule should be robust to these changes.
One possibility is to “pre-assign” some students to the schools they will ultimately attend.
Intuitively, doing so should not affect the assignments of other students. This motivates
pre-assignment invariance.26 An even milder requirement, uninterested student invariance,
limits the conclusion to situations when the pre-assigned students are unassigned in the
original problem. Similar reasoning applies to schools. If a school has no available seats,
unavailable school invariance requires that the assignments be unchanged when that school
is removed27. Another common invariance property applies when a student’s preferences
change: If that student’s assignment is unchanged, non-bossiness requires that no assignment
change. Formally,
Pre-assignment invariance: For each e ∈ E , each i ∈ N , and each j ∈ N\{i}, if a = ϕi(e),
then ϕ(N\{i}, A, (qa − 1, q−a), R−i,) = ϕN\{i}(e).
Unassigned student invariance: For each e ∈ E and each i ∈ N , if ϕi(e) = ∅, then
ϕ(N\{i}, A, q, R−i,) = ϕN\{i}(e).
Unavailable school invariance: For each e ∈ E and each a ∈ A, if qa = 0, then
ϕ(N,A\{a}, q−a, R,−a) = ϕ(e).
26This property adapts consistency to our environment. Kojima and U¨nver (2014)) propose a related
notation applicable to fixed populations: For each j ∈ N\{i}, ϕj(N,A, (qa − 1, q−a), (R∅, R−i),) = ϕj(e).
Consistency implies this property. For a comprehensive treatment of consistency, see Thomson (2009).
27Ehlers and Klaus (2012) formulate a version of this axiom which requires invariance when student
preferences are restricted to schools with available seats.
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Non-bossiness: For each e ∈ E , each i ∈ N , and each R′i ∈ R, if ϕi(e) =
ϕi(N,A, q, (R
′
i, R−i),), then ϕ(e) = ϕ(N,A, q, (R′i, R−i),).
Unfortunately, none of our rules satisfies all of these properties. IA+ compares favorably
on two counts: First, it satisfies unassigned student invariance while DA does not; and
second, it satisfies unavailable school invariance while IA does not. On the other hand,
among our rules, only IA is pre-assignment invariant or non-bossy.
Proposition 4. (i) Both IA and IA+ satisfy unassigned student invariance while DA does
not. (ii) Both IA+ and DA satisfy unavailable school invariance while IA does not. (iii) IA
satisfies pre-assignment invariance while IA+ and DA do not. (iv) IA is non-bossy while
IA+ and DA are bossy.
In a sense, IA+ modifies IA precisely to achieve unavailable school invariance. Of course,
this improvement comes at the cost of other invariance properties. Although the examples
differ, IA+ is bossy and sensitive to pre-assignment for essentially the same reason that it
violates our solidarity axioms. For example, if a student moves her assigned school to the top
of her ranking, that school may reach capacity in an earlier round and cause other students to
“skip” their applications to that school, leading to different assignments for those students.
4 Incentives
4.1 Manipulation outcomes and relative manipulability
Since rules rely on preferences reported by students, we must consider their incentives to
report truthfully. A rule is strategy-proof if no student can benefit by misrepresenting her
preferences and is group strategy-proof if no group of students can so benefit. Formally,




Group strategy-proofness: For each e ∈ E , each S ⊆ N , and each R′S ∈ RS, if there
is i ∈ S such that ϕi(N,A, q, (R′S, R−S),) Pi ϕi(e), then there is j ∈ S such that
ϕj Pj ϕj(N,A, q, (R
′
S, R−S),).
DA is strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) whereas IA and IA+
are not (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). None is group
strategy-proof.
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What outcomes can we expect when students optimally manipulate? Since DA is
strategy-proof, it has a unique dominant strategy Nash equilibrium whose outcome is the
student-optimal stable assignment (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Interestingly, the DA assign-
ment is always a Nash equilibrium outcome under both IA and IA+. In fact, the full range
of possibilities is easy to describe: For each rule, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is
precisely the set of stable assignments (Alcalde, 1996; Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006).
Although IA and IA+ are both manipulable, we can nevertheless compare them. Ac-
cording to the IA+ algorithm, students “skip” unavailable schools. In a sense, the IA+
algorithm modifies the IA algorithm by carrying out some manipulations for students. As
a result, we expect that IA+ will be less manipulable that IA. This intuition is correct.
Formally, ϕ is more manipulable than ϕ′ if ϕ is manipulable whenever ϕ′ is manipulable
and is also manipulable in at least one problem where ϕ′ is not manipulable28. We might
further expect a stronger comparison to hold: If a student is able to manipulate IA+, then
the same student is able to manipulate IA. Surprisingly, this intuition is incorrect29.
Proposition 5. (i) IA is more manipulable than IA+, which is more manipulable than DA.
(ii) There exist problems in which a student can manipulate IA+ but cannot manipulate IA.
4.2 Restricted domains
To better understand our rules, we look for conditions on capacities and priorities under
which they are strategy-proof or group strategy-proof. First, for IA and IA+, group strategy-
proofness is no more restrictive than strategy-proofness.
Lemma 1. For a given problem, IA or IA+ is manipulable by a group if and only if is
manipulable by an individual.
Since IA is non-bossy, the result is immediate because group strategy-proofness is equiv-
alent to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness30. For IA+, which is bossy, the result is more
surprising and requires proof. In contrast, for DA, the gap between strategy-proof and group
strategy-proofness is quite large. For example, DA is manipulable by a group whenever it
selects an inefficient assignment.
Second, for both IA and IA+, stability is a prerequisite for non-manipulability: If either
rule selects an unstable assignment, then it is manipulable by each student who is part of
28Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) introduce this concept of relative manipulability.
29In the language of Pathak and So¨nmez (2013), IA is not more intensely and strongly manipulable
than IA+.
30This equivalence has been observed in other contexts as well (Barbera` and Jackson, 1995; Pa´pai, 2000).
14
a blocking pair. Since IA and IA+ are efficient and DA selects the student-optimal stable
assignment, these rules are non-manipulable only when they select the DA assignment.
However, the converse is false: There exist problems in which IA and IA+ coincide with DA
yet are manipulable (see Example 2).
Building on these observations, we can describe domains on which our rules have desirable
incentive properties. Some conditions are known. First, DA is group strategy-proof on the
domain of problems with “acyclic” priority-capacity structures (Ergin, 2002). Second, IA is
strategy-proof on the domain of problems in which the combined capacity of the smallest two
schools can accommodate all students (Kumano, 2013; Chen, 2014). The condition for IA+
is similar, but slightly less rigid since it cannot be violated by unavailable schools. Although
stated for strategy-proofness, by Lemma 1, the results for IA and IA+ immediately extend
to group strategy-proofness. Moreover, these domains are maximal: Each result fails on any
enlargement of the domain.
Proposition 6. Each restriction specifies a maximal domain on which the named rule is
group strategy-proof:
(i) (Ergin, 2002) DA: Acyclic priority-capacity structures.
(ii) (Chen, 2014) IA: The number of students does not exceed the combined capacity of the
smallest two schools.
(iii) IA+: The number of students does not exceed the combined capacity of the smallest two
schools with available seats.
Both conditions (ii) and (iii) imply acyclicity, so the conditions for IA and IA+ are more
restrictive than for DA. The difference between conditions (ii) and (iii) concerns unavailable
schools. Under IA, students apply to these schools, so these schools must be considered
when comparing capacities of pairs of schools. Since IA+ ignores unavailable schools, the
capacity restrictions apply only to schools with available seats. The difference is small, but
may be relevant in practice. For example, if the opening of a new school is delayed, IA may
penalize students who rank the new school, thereby encouraging misrepresentation. This
possibility does not arise with IA+ or DA.
5 Conclusion
Complementing recent studies that aim to improve school choice rules, we provide a system-
atic analysis of immediate-acceptance-with-skips. By modifying the immediate acceptance
algorithm, IA+ moves part way from IA toward DA, and the properties of the rule reflect
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IA IA+ DA TTC Priority
family
non-wastefulness + + + + +
efficiency + + − + +
rank efficiency − − − − −
indiv. rationality + + + + +
stability − − + − −
mutual best + + + + −
favor higher ranks + − − − −
unavail. school inv. − + + + +
capacity monotonicity + − + − +
uninterest. student inv. + + + + +
unassign. student inv. + + − + +
population monotonicity + − + − +
consistency + − − − +
improvement inv. + + + + +
weak monotonicity + + + + +
non-bossiness + − − + +
strategy-proof. − − + + +
group strategy-proof. − − − + +
Table 1: Properties satisfied by leading rules. We include top-trading cycles (TTC)
and additional axioms for completeness.
this compromise. Table 5 summarizes our results.31 Moving from IA to IA+ leads to better
incentive properties, both when considering manipulations by individuals and manipulations
by groups. It also responds more reasonably to the removal of an unavailable school. Moving
from DA to IA+ improves efficiency and eliminates undesirable sensitivity to the removal of
unassigned students. However, these benefits come at a cost: Unlike IA, IA+ violates natu-
ral solidarity and invariance properties; unlike DA, IA+ is manipulable and allows justified
envy. Our analysis demonstrates once again the inevitability of difficult trade-offs. Although
the properties of benchmark rules are well understood, much work remains to delineate the
properties of compromise methods.
31For comparison, we also include properties of other rules discussed in recent characterizations. For DA,
see Kojima and Manea (2010), Morrill (2013a), and Ehlers and Klaus (2012). For TTC, see Abdulkadirog˘lu




This appendix collects proofs and examples omitted from the text. For ease of presentation,
we organize the proofs according to the section in which they appear.
A.1 Efficiency, equity, and robustness
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) It is well-known that IA is efficient and that DA is not, so we consider IA+.
When applied to a given problem, in each round of the algorithm unassigned students apply
to their most preferred school among those with remaining capacity. Therefore, to make a
student better off, she must be assigned to a school whose capacity is exhausted in a round
earlier than the round in which she is assigned. Since students are only rejected when a
school reaches its capacity, such an assignment is possible only if another student is assigned
to a school in a later round than initially. But then this student is worse off. Thus, no Pareto
improvement is possible.
(ii) We construct a problem in which both IA and IA+ select a match that Pareto
dominates the DA match. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, A ≡ {a, b, c}, and
(q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 a b c
b a a 1 2 3
a b b 2 3 1














(1, a), (2, b), (3, c)
)
.
Students 1 and 2 prefer their assignments under IA(e) = IA+(e) while student 3 receives
the same assignment, so IA(e) = IA+(e) Pareto dominates DA(e).
(iii) Rank efficiency implies efficiency (Featherstone, 2013) and DA is not efficient, so it
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is not rank efficient. To show that neither of the other rules are rank efficient, we construct a
problem in which both IA and IA+ select rank dominated matches. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,)
with N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 a b c d
a a c c 1 1 1 1
b c d b 2 2 2 2
... b
... d 3 3 3 3









(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d)
)
.
However, both matches are rank dominated by µ ≡ ((1, b), (2, a), (3, d), (4, c)): The rank
distributions are N(IA(e)) = (2, 1, 0, 1), N(IA+(e)) = (2, 0, 2, 0), and N(µ) = (2, 2, 0, 0), so
N(µ) sd-dominates both N(IA(e)) and N(IA+(e)).
(iv) First we show that IA and DA may rank dominate IA+. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,)
with N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d, e}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d e
a a a e e 1 2 3 4 5


















(1, a), (2, b), (3, d), (4, c), (5, e)
)
.
The rank distributions are N(IA(e)) = N(DA(e)) = (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) and N(IA+(e)) =
(2, 1, 1, 0, 1), so N(IA(e)) and N(DA(e)) sd-dominate N(IA+(e)).
18
Next we show that IA+ may rank dominate IA. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d, e}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d e



















(1, a), (2, b), (3, e), (4, d), (5, c)
)
.
The rank distributions are N(IA(e)) = (2, 1, 1, 0, 1) and N(IA(e)) = (2, 1, 1, 1, 0), so
N(IA+(e)) sd-dominates N(IA(e)).
(v) Let e ∈ E and suppose that N(DA(e)) sd-dominates N(IA(e)). We show that
DA(e) = IA(e). In the first round of each algorithm, each student applies to her first choice
school. Consequently, the same applications and rejections occur in the first round. Each
student accepted in the first round under IA is permanently assigned to her first choice and
the set of students finally assigned to their first choice schools is a subset of these students.
By assumption, N1(DA(e)) ≥ N1(IA(e)), so these students are never rejected in later rounds
under DA. That is, IA and DA assign the same set of students to their first choice schools.
Moreover, the set of students rejected in the first round is the same for both algorithms.
In the second round of each algorithm, each rejected student applies to her second choice
school. Since these are the same sets of students, the same applications occur. Also, since
no student tentatively assigned by DA in the first round is subsequently rejected, the same
rejections occur. Reasoning as before, N2(DA(e)) = N2(IA(e)) and the same set of students
are IA and DA assign the same set of students to their second choice schools. Repeating
this argument for each k = 2, . . . , |A|, we conclude that DA(e) = IA(e).
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It is well known that DA is stable (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). To complete the
proof, we provide examples showing that IA+ may select a stable assignment when IA does
not and vice-versa.
IA+ selects a stable assignment and IA does not. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with
N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 a b c d

















(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d)
)
.
In this problem, IA+(e) is stable because it matches each student with a school at which she
has first priority. However, IA(e) is not stable because (3, c) is a blocking pair: c P3 d and
3 c 4 while IA3(e) = d and IA4(e) = c.
IA selects a stable assignment and IA+ does not. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with
N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d, e}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d e
a a a e e 1 2 3 4 5





















In this problem, IA(e) is stable because it matches each student with a school at which she
has first priority. However, IA+(e) is not stable because (3, c) is a blocking pair: c P3 d and
3 c 4 while IA3(e) = d and IA4(e) = c.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Both DA and IA satisfy a version of population monotonicity in which departures are
modeled by moving the emptyset to the top of a student’s preference relation (Kojima and
Manea, 2010; Kojima and U¨nver, 2014), and together with uninterested student invariance,
this version implies population monotonicity. Since DA and IA also satisfy uninterested
student invariance, they are population monotonic. Furthermore, both rules are known to
satisfy capacity monotonicity (Kojima and Manea, 2010; Kojima and U¨nver, 2014). We
provide examples showing that IA+ satisfies neither property.
IA+ is not population monotonic. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
A ≡ {a, b, c, d, e}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d e
a a a a b 1 2 3 4
...











(1, a), (2, e), (3, c), (4, d), (5, b)
)
. Now suppose student 5 leaves. Let e′ ≡
(N\{5}, A, q, R−5,). Then IA+(e′) =
(
(1, a), (2, b), (3, d), (4, c)
)
. Since IA+3 (e) = c P3 d =
IA+3 (e
′), this violates population monotonicity.
IA+ is not capacity monotonic. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
A ≡ {a, b, c, d}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (2)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d
a b a a a 1 2 3
...
...
... b c b
... 5 4







(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d), (5, d)
)
. Now suppose an extra seat becomes avail-
able at b so q′ ≡ (1, 2, 1, 2) and e′ ≡ (N,A, q′, R,). In the new economy, IA+(e′) =(
(1, a), (2, b), (3, d), (4, c), (5, b)
)
. Since IA+3 (e) = c P3 d = IA
+
3 (e
′) while IA+4 (e
′) = c P4 d =
IA+4 (e), this violates resource monotonicity.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (i) Pre-assignment invariance
IA satisfies a limited version of pre-assignment invariance in which instead of removing
pre-assigned students their preferences are replaced with the emptyset moved to the top
(Kojima and U¨nver, 2014). Since IA is invariant when such students are removed from the
problem, it satisfies pre-assignment invariance.
We show by example in (ii) below that DA may violate unassigned student invariance.
Since pre-assignment invariance implies unassigned student invariance, DA also violates
pre-assignment invariance.
We show by example that IA+ may violate the property. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with
N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, A ≡ {a, b, c}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 a b c








(1, a), (2, c), (3, b)
)
. Now fix student 1’s assignment. Let q′ ≡ (0, 1, 1) and
e′ ≡ (N\{1}, A, q′, R−1,). Then IA+(e′) =
(
(2, b), (3, c)
)
. Since IA+(e′) 6= IA+−1(e), this
violates pre-assignment invariance.
(ii) Unassigned student invariance
According to the IA and IA+ algorithms, an unassigned student is rejected by each
school to which she applies. Therefore, removing the student does not affect the pattern
of applications or acceptances and rejections for other students, so IA and IA+ satisfy
unassigned student invariance.
We show by example that DA may violate the property. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with
N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, A ≡ {a, b}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
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(1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 a b
a a b 3 2




(1, ∅), (2, b), (3, a)). Now remove student 1 who is unassigned. Let e′ ≡
(N\{1}, A, q, R−1,). Then DA(e′) =
(
(2, a), (3, b)
)
. Since DA(e′) 6= DA−1(e), this violates
unassigned student invariance.
(iii) Unavailable school invariance
According to the IA+ algorithm, no student ever applies to an unavailable school. Re-
moving the school does not affect the pattern of applications or acceptances and rejections,
so IA+ satisfies unavailable school invariance. According to the DA algorithm, an unavail-
able school never tentatively accepts any students. Removing the school does not change the
pattern of tentative acceptances or final assignments, so DA also satisfies unavailable school
invariance.
We show by example that IA may violate the property. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with
N ≡ {1, 2}, A ≡ {a, b}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(0) (1)






(1, ∅), (2, a)). Now remove the unavailable school a. Let e′ ≡
(N,A\{a}, q−a, R|A\{a},−a). In the new problem, IA(e′) =
(
(1, a), (2, ∅)). Since IA+(e′) 6=
IA+(e), this violates unavailable school invariance.
(iv) Non-bossiness
To see that IA is non-bossy, let e ∈ E , i ∈ N , R′i ∈ R, and e′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′i, R−i),).
If IA(e) = IA(e′), there is nothing to show, so suppose not and let k be the first round
in which the assignments made by the IA algorithm in e and e′ differ. Suppose there is
j ∈ N\{i} whose assignment changes in this round and let a be the school student j applies
to in round k. Then either IAj(e) = a 6= IAj(e′) or IAj(e) 6= a = IAj(e′). Without loss
of generality, suppose IAj(e) = a 6= IAj(e′). This requires that student i applies to and
is accepted by a in round k in e′ and that student i does not apply to a in round k in e.
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Furthermore, a reaches capacity in round k in both e and e′. Therefore, IAi(e′) = a 6= IAi(e)
and student i’s assignment also changes.
It is well-known that DA is bossy (Ergin, 2002). We show by example that IA+ is bossy
as well. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d, e}, and (q, R,) as
specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 a b c d e
a a e e e 1 2 3 4 5












(1, a), (2, b), (3, d), (4, c), (5, e)
)
. Now suppose student 2 reports R′2
which ranks b first. Let e′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′2, R−2),). In the new problem, IA+(e′) =(
(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d), (5, e)
)
. Since IA+2 (e
′) = IA+2 (e) but IA
+(e′) 6= IA+(e), this vi-
olates non-bossiness.
A.2 Incentives
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. (i) Since DA is strategy-proof, both IA and IA+ are more manipulable than DA. It
remains to compare IA and IA+.
Suppose that IA+ is manipulable at e ≡ (N,A, q, R,). Then there is i ∈ N and R′i ∈ R
such that IA+i (N,A, q, (R
′
i, R−i),) Pi IA+i (e). Let e′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′i, R−i),), a ≡ IA+i (e′),
and b ≡ IA+i (e) so a Pi b. Without loss of generality, we may assume that R′i ranks a first.
Also, we may assume that a is the best attainable school for student i given R−i: For each
R˜i ∈ R, a Ri IA(N,A, q, (R˜i, R−i),). Let c ≡ IAi(e), R′′i ∈ R rank c first, R′′ ≡ (R′′i , R−i),
and e′′ ≡ (N,A, q, R′′,). Then IAi(e′′) = c as well. Moreover, since IA+ and IA form the
same matches in the first step,
a = IA+i (e) = IA
+
i (e
′) = IAi(e′) and
c = IAi(e) = IAi(e
′′) = IA+i (e
′′).
By the choice of a, since student i can obtain c under IA+ given R−i, a Ri c. If a Pi c, then
student i can can manipulate IA at e, so suppose a = c. Then there is j ∈ N\{i} such that
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IA+j (e) = a and IAj(e) 6= a. Let a′ ≡ IAj(e). If a Pj a′, then student j can manipulate IA
at e. Suppose instead that a′ Pj a. Let R′j ∈ R rank a′ first and e′′′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′j, R−j),).
Then
a′ = IAj(e) = IAj(e′′′) = IA+j (e
′′′),
so student j can manipulate IA+ at e. Then there is k ∈ N\{i, j} such that IA+k (e) = a′ and
IAk(e) 6= a′. Applying the same arguments again, if student k cannot manipulate IA at e,
then student k can manipulate IA+ at e. Continuing in this fashion, we obtain a sequence of
students, each of whom can manipulate IA+ at e. By finiteness, either at least one student
can manipulate IA at e or the sequence contains all students. However, IA+ is efficient, so
not all students can manipulate IA+ at e. Instead, IA is manipulable at e.
Finally, we show by example that IA may be manipulable when IA+ is not. Let e ≡
(N,A, q, R,) with N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d}, and (q, R,) as specified in the table:
(1) (1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 R4 a b c d

















(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, d)
)
.
Student 3 can manipulate IA at IA(e): If student 3 instead reports R′3 with c ranked
first, then IA3(N,A, q, (R
′
3, R−3),) = c and c P3 d. On the other hand, IA+(e) is not
manipulable. Students 1 and 2 are matched with their most preferred schools and neither
student 3 nor 4 can obtain a better school by reporting different preferences.
(ii) We show by example that a student may be able to manipulate IA+ but unable to
manipulate IA. Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, A ≡ {a, b, c, d, e, f}, and (q, R,) as specified in
the table:
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(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
R0 R
′
0 a b c d e f
a e 1 6 2 3 5 6
b a










Let R ≡ (R0, R0, R0, R0, R′0, R′0) and e ≡ (N,A, q, R,). The assignments are
IA(e) =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6




1 2 3 4 5 6
a c d f e b
)
.
Student 2 can manipulate IA+ at e: If student 2 reports R′2 with b ranked first, then
IA+2 (N,A, q, (R
′
2, R−2),) = b and b P2 c. However, IA2(e) = b and student 2 cannot obtain
a preferred assignment under IA by reporting different preferences. Thus, while student 2
can manipulate IA+ at e, the same student cannot manipulate IA at e.
Example 2. A problem in which IA+ and IA coincide with DA but are manip-
ulable. Let e ≡ (N,A, q, R,) with N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, A ≡ {a, b, c}, and (q, R,) as specified
in the table:
(1) (1) (1)
R1 R2 R3 a b c






Then IA(e) = IA+(e) = DA(e) =
(
(1, a), (2, b), (3, c)
)
. However, student 3 can manipulate
both IA and IA+ at e. Let R3 ∈ R rank b first and e′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′3, R−3),). As computed
in the table below, IA(e) = IA+(e) =
(
(1, a), (2, c), (3, b)
)
. Since b P3 c, student 3 benefits
from the misrepresentation. In contrast, DA(e′) = DA(e).
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In our model, group strategy-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-
bossiness32. Since IA is non-bossy, it is manipulable by an individual whenever it is manip-
32This well-known fact is proven in many contexts, e.g. Pa´pai (2000).
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ulable by a group.
Now consider IA+. Let e ∈ E and suppose S ⊆ N can manipulate IA+ at e by reporting
R′S ∈ RS. Let e′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′S, R−S),). Then there is i ∈ S such that IA+i (e′) Pi
IA+i (e). Let a ≡ IA+i (e′) and R′′i ∈ R be formed from R′i by moving a to the top. Also
let eˆ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′′i , R−i),) and eˆ′ ≡ (N,A, q, (R′′i , R′S\{i}, R−S),). Then IA+i (eˆ′) = a. If
IA+i (eˆ) = a, then student i can manipulate IA
+ at e.
Suppose instead that IA+i (eˆ) 6= a. When IA+ is applied to eˆ, a rejects student i in the
first round. Therefore, a is filled to capacity in the first round and for each j ∈ N such that
IA+j (eˆ) = a, j a i. If j 6∈ S, then j also applies to a in the first round when IA+ is applied
to eˆ′. Since IA+i (eˆ
′) = a and j a i, IA+j (eˆ′) = a and IA+j (e′) = a as well. Instead, there is
i′ ∈ S such that IA+i′ (eˆ) = a 6= IA+i′ (eˆ′). But then Ri′ ranks a first and so i′ is worse off at
e′ than at e which contradicts the assumption that R′S is a profitable deviation for S.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 6
To formally describe the restricted domains, we introduce additional notation. Let Q : N ×
A → ZA+ and pi : N ×A → Π be such that for each (N,A) ⊆ N ×A, Q(N,A)|A ⊆ ZA+ and
pi(N,A) ⊆ Π|N . Let E(Q, pi) be the set of problems with capacities and priorities restricted
to (Q, pi): E(Q, pi) ≡ {e ∈ E : q ∈ Q(N,A) and ∈ pi(N,A)}. For each (N,A) ⊆ N × A,
define Q∗ and Q∗∗ by
Q∗(N,A) ≡ {q ∈ ZA+ : ∀a, b ∈ A, qa + qb ≥ |N |}
Q∗∗(N,A) ≡ {q ∈ ZA+ : ∀a, b ∈ A, qa, qb > 0⇒ qa + qb ≥ |N |}.
Then E(Q∗,Π) ( E(Q∗∗,Π). In words, E(Q∗,Π) is the set of problems in which no two schools
have combined capacity less than the total number of students and E(Q∗∗,Π) enlarges this
set by limiting the restriction to schools with available seats. We now prove Proposition 6.
Proof. (i-ii) DA is known to be group strategy-proof on the domain of problems with acyclic
priority-capacity structures and is not group strategy-proof on any domain that strictly
includes this domain (Ergin, 2002). Similarly, IA is strategy-proof on E(Q∗,Π) and is not
strategy-proof on any domain that strictly includes this domain (Chen, 2014). By Lemma 1,
this conclusion applies to group strategy-proofness as well.
(iii) We show that IA+ is group strategy-proof on E(Q∗∗,Π). Let e ∈ E(Q∗∗,Π) and
A∗ ≡ {a ∈ A : qa > 0}. According to the IA+ algorithm, each student applies to a school
in A∗ in the first round. Let i ∈ N and let a, b ∈ A∗ be the schools ranked first and second
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in Ri. By assumption, qa + qb ≥ |N |. Therefore, if student i is rejected by a in the first
round, then she will be accepted by b in the second round. Consequently, student i cannot
benefit by misreporting. Similarly, no student accepted in the first round has incentive to
misreport, so IA(e) is not manipulable. That is, IA+ is strategy-proof on E(Q∗∗,Π). By
Lemma 1, IA+ is also group strategy-proof on E(Q∗∗,Π).
(ii) We show that IA+ is not group strategy-proof on any domain that strictly in-
cludes E(Q∗∗,Π). Let (Q, pi) be such that E(Q, pi) 6⊆ E(Q∗∗, pi) and let e ∈ E(Q, pi)\E(Q∗, pi).
Then there is a pair a, b ∈ A such that qa, qb > 0 and qa + qb < |N |. Let Rab rank a
first and b second and let Rba rank b first and a second. Let i ∈ N be the student with
the lowest priority at b. Let R′i ≡ Rba and for each j ∈ N\{i}, let R′j = Rab. Then
e′ ≡ (N,A, q, R′,) ∈ E(Q, pi).
We claim that IA(e′) is manipulable. Under IA+, |N |−1 students apply to a in the first
round and |N | − 1− qa are rejected. By assumption, qa < |N | − qb, so |N | − 1− qa ≥ qb ≥ 1.
Since i applies to b in the first round, IAi(e
′) = b. In the second round, the |N | − 1 − qa
unassigned students apply to b. However, only qb− 1 < |N | − 1− qa seats remain so at least
one student, say j, is rejected by b. By choice of student i, j b i, so IA+(e′) is not stable.
Moreover, it is manipulable by student j: If student j reports Rba instead, then student j
will be assigned to b in the first round. Therefore, IA+ is not strategy-proof on E(Q, pi).
References
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A. and Che, Y.-K. (2010). The role of priorities in assigning indivisible
objects: A characterization of top trading cycles. Mimeo.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Che, Y.-K., and Yasuda, Y. (2011). Resolving conflicting preferences
in school choice: The “Boston mechanism” reconsidered. American Economics Review,
101:399–410.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Che, Y.-K., and Yasuda, Y. (2014). Expanding “choice” in school choice.
American Economics Journal. Forthcoming.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Pathak, P. A., and Roth, A. E. (2005a). The New York City high school
match. American Economics Review: Papers and Proceedings, 95(2):364–367.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Pathak, P. A., and Roth, A. E. (2009). Strategy-proofness versus effi-
ciency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the New York City high school match.
Technical Report w14864, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., and So¨nmez, T. (2005b). The Boston public
school match. American Economics Review: Papers and Proceedings, 95(2):368–371.
28
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., and So¨nmez, T. (2006). Changing the
Boston school choice mechanism: Strategyproofness as equal access. Technical Report
w11965, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A. and So¨nmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach.
American Economic Review, 93(3):729–747.
Afacan, M. O. (2013). Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism. Mathematical
Social Sciences, 66:176–179.
Alcalde, J. (1996). Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems. Journal of
Economic Theory, 69(1):240–254.
Balinski, M. and So¨nmez, T. (1999). A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal
of Economic Theory, 84:73–94.
Barbera`, S. and Jackson, M. O. (1995). Strategy-proof exchange. Econometrica, 63(1):51–87.
Chen, Y. (2012). Characterizing the Boston mechanism. Mimeo.
Chen, Y. (2014). When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? Mathematical Social
Sciences, 71:43–45.
Chen, Y. and Kesten, O. (2013). From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance:
Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms. Mimeo.
Chen, Y. and So¨nmez, T. (2006). School choice: An experimental study. Journal of Economic
Theory, 127(1):202–231.
Dog˘an, B. (2013). Responsive affirmative action in school choice. Mimeo.
Dubins, L. E. and Freedman, D. A. (1981). Machiavelli and the gale-shapley algorithm. The
American Mathematical Monthly, 88(7):485–494.
Dur, U. (2012). Characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice
problem. Mimeo.
Dur, U. (2013). The modified Boston mechanism. Mimeo.
Ehlers, L. and Klaus, B. (2012). Strategy-proofness makes the difference: Deferred-
acceptance with responsive priorities. mimeo.
Erdil, A. and Ergin, H. (2011). Whats the matter with tie-breaking? improving efficiency
in school choice. American Economics Review, 98(3):669–689.
Ergin, H. (2002). Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities. Econometrica,
70(6):2489–2497.
Ergin, H. and So¨nmez, T. (2006). Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism.
Journal of Public Economics, 90:215–237.
29
Featherstone, C. (2013). Rank efficiency: Investigating a widespread ordinal welfare criterion.
Mimeo.
Featherstone, C. and Niederle, M. (2008). Ex ante efficiency in school choice mechanisms:
An experimental investigation. Technical Report w41618, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Gale, D. and Shapley, L. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The
American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1):9–15.
He, Y. (2012). Gaming the Boston school choice mechanism in Beijing. Mimeo.
Kesten, O. (2006). On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems.
Journal of Economic Theory, 127:155–171.
Kesten, O. (2010). School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3):1297–
1348.
Kesten, O. (2012). On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems. Economic
Theory.
Klaus, B. and Klijn, F. (2013). Local and global consistency properties for student placement.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49:222–229.
Kojima, F. and Manea, M. (2010). Axioms for deferred acceptance. Econometrica, 78(2):633–
653.
Kojima, F. and U¨nver, M. U. (2014). The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: An axiomatic
approach. Economic Theory, 55(3):515–544.
Kumano, T. (2013). Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost
impossibility result. Journal of Public Economics, 105:23–29.
Mennle, T. and Seuken, S. (2014). The adaptive Boston mechanism. Mimeo.
Miralles, A. (2008). School choice: The case for the Boston mechanism. Mimeo.
Morrill, T. (2013a). An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
International Journal of Game Theory, 42:19–28.
Morrill, T. (2013b). An alternative characterization of top trading cycles. Economic Theory,
54(1):181–197.
Morrill, T. (2013c). Making efficient school assignment fairer. Mimeo.
Morrill, T. (2013d). Two simple variations of top trading cycles. Mimeo.
Pais, J. and Pinte´r, A´. (2008). School choice and information: An experimental study on
matching mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior.
30
Pa´pai, S. (2000). Strategyproof assignment by hierarchical assignment. Econometrica,
68(6):1403–1433.
Pathak, P. A. and So¨nmez, T. (2008). Leveling the playing field sincere and sophisticated
players in the Boston mechanism. American Economics Review, 98(4):1635–1654.
Pathak, P. A. and So¨nmez, T. (2013). School admissions reform in Chicago and England:
Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. American Economics Re-
view, 103(1):80–106.
Roth, A. E. (1982). The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of
Operations Research, 7(4):617–628.
Roth, A. E. (2008). Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open
questions. International Journal of Game Theory, 36(3-4):537–569.
Roth, A. E. and Sotomayor, M. (1990). Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic
modeling and analysis. Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Thomson, W. (1983a). The fair division of a fixed supply among a growing population.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 8:319–326.
Thomson, W. (1983b). Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution. Journal of
Economic Theory, 31:211–226.
Thomson, W. (2009). Consistent allocation rules. Monograph edition.
31
